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I. INTRODUCTION
In a December 2011 filing with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Western Union Company admitted
that its previous tax returns had underreported the value of property it
had received during a business restructuring by over $800 million.1  This
admission ended an extensive Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service)
transfer pricing investigation that concluded with a $220 million payment
by Western Union to the IRS.2  This settlement payment added to a $250 
million deposit that the company had made prior to settlement negotiations.3 
By comparison, this transfer pricing adjustment resulted in a total charge
approaching Goldman Sachs’s $550 million penalty to the SEC for
misleading investors, yet to a much smaller company.4  This victory for
1. See Press Release, W. Union Co., W. Union Reaches Agreement with IRS 
(Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://ir.westernunion.com/News/Press-Releases/Press-
Release-Details/2011/Western-Union-Reaches-Agreement-with-IRS/default.aspx; Associated 
Press, Western Union To Pay $220M More in IRS Settlement, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Dec. 15, 2011, 9:22 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9RLAM 
O00.htm.
2. Press Release, W. Union Co., supra note 1; Associated Press, supra note 1. 
Transfer prices are the dollar values that must be reported to the IRS for calculating taxes
when transactions occur between closely related parties, such as an American parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary located in another country.  Yariv Brauner, 
Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing
Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79, 81 (2008). 
3. Press Release, W. Union Co., supra note 1; Associated Press, supra note 1. 
4. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs To Pay Record $550 Million To Settle
SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm. At the end of the years in which
they received their penalties, Goldman Sachs had total assets of $923 billion whereas 
Western Union had total assets of $9 billion.  Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Annual Report 
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the IRS also came on the heels of an unprecedented $3.4 billion transfer
pricing settlement with pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline in
2006.5 
At the heart of the Western Union investigation were the transfer prices
assigned to intangible assets that First Data Corporation transferred to 
Western Union when Western Union was spun off as its own independent
business.6  The IRS and many of its foreign counterparts require that 
these transfer prices be determined based upon the “arm’s length” 
principle.7  In other words, the prices assigned to these transactions must
be set at a level where the involved parties would be taxed the same
amount on the transaction as if they were unrelated to each other and 
doing business in the open market.8  Further, this standard is largely subject
to interpretation and debate by both the companies involved and the IRS,
which ultimately inspects and scrutinizes the selected transfer prices.9 
The arm’s length standard also leaves room for strategic manipulation, 
especially when these transactions occur between closely related parties
located in countries with disparate corporate tax rates.10  In these 
5. See Audrey Nutt, Glaxo, IRS Settle Transfer Pricing Dispute for $3.4 Billion, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 12, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 176-1. Although the 
final settlement amount was $3.4 billion, GlaxoSmithKline also admitted that its exposure
for “potential transfer pricing adjustments was, as of December 31, 2005, $11.5 billion 
for its 1989 through 2005 tax years.”  Id.
6. Associated Press, supra note 1. 
7. See I.R.C. § 482 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (as amended in 2012). 
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b); Brauner, supra note 2, at 81–82. 
9. See MICHELLE MARKHAM, THE TRANSFER PRICING OF INTANGIBLES 20, 23–24
(2005). The IRS is granted broad discretion and power to scrutinize and adjust transfer 
prices under Internal Revenue Code § 482 (2006), which provides that 
[i]n any case of two or more organizations . . . the Secretary may distribute, 
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or
among such organizations . . . if he determines that such distribution, 
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes 
or clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations. 
Id. at 20 (quoting I.R.C. § 482 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
10. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 734–37 
(2011) (outlining several transfer pricing strategies used to shift profits from countries 
with high corporate tax rates to countries with low corporate tax rates); see also Tom 
Bergin, Special Report: Amazon’s Billion-Dollar Tax Shield, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2012,
11:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/06/us-tax-amazon-idUSBRE8B50 
AR20121206 (explaining Amazon.com’s use of transfer pricing to channel profits
through Luxemburg to reduce its tax rate); Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How 
























   
 
  
    
  
 






circumstances, where one party is located in a country with a very high
corporate tax rate and the other controlled company is in a country with
a very low corporate tax rate, there is a financial incentive for businesses
to escape being taxed at the higher corporate tax rate by recognizing as 
much revenue as possible in the lower tax country.11 
For example, Google Inc. has used transfer pricing as part of a broader 
tax strategy to reduce its overseas tax rate to 2.4%, despite earning its 
foreign revenue in a majority of countries where the “average corporate 
rate is well over 20 percent.”12  Apple Inc. similarly paid 1.9% in taxes 
on foreign pretax profits of $36.8 billion.13  In comparison, the top marginal 
domestic corporate tax rate for these two companies’ revenue earned in 
the United States is 35%.14  In Google’s strategy, nicknamed the “Double 
Irish/Dutch Sandwich,” the company first transferred the rights to its 
search and advertising technologies to a wholly owned subsidiary in 
Ireland.15  Next, the subsidiary in Ireland became a resident of Bermuda 
for tax purposes and again licensed the rights it received from the parent 
Google to another controlled subsidiary in the Netherlands.16  Finally, 
the Dutch subsidiary licensed these rights back to a second but separate 
wholly owned subsidiary in Ireland, which once again licensed these 
rights and collected billions of dollars in advertising revenues from their 
use while benefitting from Ireland’s low corporate tax rate, a result achieved
by taking advantage of loopholes in each of the involved countries’ tax 
systems.17 One tax program director went so far as to say, “The system is 
broken . . . . Companies are getting away with murder.”18 
o-tax-loopholes.html (describing Google’s successful use of transfer pricing as part of a 
comprehensive strategy to lower its tax rate).
11. See Bergin, supra note 10; Drucker, supra note 10. 
12. Drucker, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13. Apple Paid Only 2% Corporation Tax Outside US, BBC NEWS, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20197710 (last updated Nov. 4, 2012, 9:08 PM).  Other
large firms have obtained similar results in high-tax countries.  See Starbucks ‘Paid Just 
£8.6m UK Tax in 14 Years,’ BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19967397
(last updated Oct. 16, 2012, 1:28 PM) (noting that Starbucks Corporation paid less than 
one percent in corporation tax and identifying payments between subsidiaries as a “factor
in reducing its taxable income in the UK”); Kenneth Thomas, Boy Is This a Galling Tax
Dodge from Facebook: It Paid 0.3% Taxes on $1.34 Billion Profits, BUS. INSIDER (Dec.
28, 2012, 7:27 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/surprise-facebook-avoids-its-european-
taxes-2012-12#!CgSvb (describing how Facebook channels its profits through multiple
foreign subsidiaries to reduce taxes).
14. See IRS, PUBLICATION 542: CORPORATIONS 16–17 (rev. 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p542.pdf (showing a tax rate of thirty-five percent for
corporate income over $18,333,333). 
15. Kleinbard, supra note 10, at 708–10. 
16. Id. at 709. 
17. Id. at 709–10. Of importance for this Comment’s ensuing discussion, Google 
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Now, energized by its largest transfer pricing victory in recent years, 
the IRS is forming an elite team of professionals recruited from the Big
Four audit firms and prominent law firms to “[c]rush [t]ransfer [p]ricing 
[a]buse.”19  This latest IRS recruitment effort also coincides with the
hiring of several hundred additional international examiners, with a goal 
of hiring 120 auditors primarily responsible for transfer pricing reviews.20 
According to a former IRS division director, Craig Sharon, although the 
IRS lags behind its foreign counterparts in transfer pricing enforcement, 
the Service’s recent changes will help close the gap.21  The shift within 
the IRS over the last several years is part of a global trend by governmental 
tax authorities to protect and increase their countries’ tax bases in a 
challenging economy by ramping up transfer pricing enforcement.22  In 
agreement locked in the transfer prices that Google assigned to its search technology rights 
and other intangible assets when it transferred these items to the first Irish subsidiary.
See id.
18. Drucker, supra note 10 (quoting the remarks of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
director of the international tax program at the University of Michigan Law School)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Brings ‘A Team’ To Crush Transfer Pricing Abuse, 
FORBES (Mar. 27, 2012, 2:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/ 
03/27/irs-brings-a-team-to-crush-transfer-pricing-abuse/. This “dream team” includes
tax specialists from the firms KPMG, Ernst & Young, Mayer Brown, and Covington & 
Burling. Id.; see also Patrick Temple-West, U.S. IRS Forms ‘Swat Team’ for Tax
Dodger Crackdown, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/03/20/usa-tax-irs-transfer-idUSL1E8EKHU220120320 (noting the same). 
20. ERNST & YOUNG, 2010 GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SURVEY 5 (2010), available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_transfer_pricing_survey_-_2010/$FILE/
2010-Globaltransferpricingsurvey_17Jan.pdf. 
21. Stephanie Berrong, Google’s ‘Double Irish’ and ‘Dutch Sandwich’ Schemes
Raise Questions About Tax System, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 7, 2010, available at
LEXIS, 2010 TNT 234-5. 
22. ERNST & YOUNG, 2012 GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING TAX AUTHORITY SURVEY 
7–8 (2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/2012-Global-TP- 
Tax-Authority-Survey/$FILE/2012-Global-TP-Tax-Authority-Survey.pdf.  The international 
community has embraced this goal, with the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors (G20) soliciting the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) to develop a comprehensive action plan to combat tax base 
erosion and profit shifting strategies.  OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND 
PROFIT SHIFTING 11 (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf. 
G20 is composed of nineteen countries and the European Union. About G20, G20.org,















   
   
     
   
 
   
 




    
  
   
 
   
  
September 2012, the IRS emphasized that transfer pricing enforcement 
is the Service’s biggest challenge looking forward.23 
Companies involved in transfer pricing are not blind to or complacent
about the regulatory risks that Western Union and GlaxoSmithKline failed 
to navigate. A survey conducted by Ernst & Young reported that 74% of 
parent company respondents and 76% of subsidiary respondents disclosed 
that transfer pricing is either an “absolutely critical” or “very important” 
tax issue that they are facing over the next few years.24 
Faced with this high-stakes environment and increasing governmental
scrutiny, one potentially effective way for multinational enterprises to
manage the risks involved in setting their transfer prices is to negotiate an
advance pricing agreement (APA) with the IRS and other taxing
authorities.25  These agreements provide several advantages, including 
significant savings in time and costs associated with investigations and 
litigation by likely preventing the business from becoming entangled in a 
transfer pricing dispute similar to the one Western Union faced.26 
While confronting an increase in transfer pricing enforcement activity, 
at-risk businesses will likely find APAs offered by the IRS more attractive 
than ever.27  Yet, the IRS program that negotiates and issues APAs, originally 
known as the Advance Pricing Agreement Program (APA Program) and 
recently reformed into the Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement Program 
(APMA Program or Program), has consistently come under serious negative
scrutiny.28  Specifically, international tax practitioners have questioned 
23. Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 1 (Microsoft and
Hewlett–Packard): Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 112th Cong. 147 (2012) (statement of William J. Wilkins,
Chief Counsel, IRS). 
24. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 20, at 3. 
25. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 22, at 4, 11.  An APA is an agreement between a 
taxpayer and the IRS as to the best transfer pricing method before the controlled
transactions occur.  Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 279, § 2.04. 
26. See OECD, OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 173 (2010). 
27. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 22, at 11 (describing the increased availability of
APAs as a “welcome development[]” for businesses because transfer pricing penalties
are becoming “more frequent and more onerous”).  The fact that countries continue to
create new APA programs also shows the demand for these types of agreements. See 
Antonis Desipris, Greece Amends Transfer Pricing Framework and Introduces APA 
Program, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Mar. 4, 2013, at 1, 5, available at LEXIS, 2013 
WTD 42-9; Cecilia Lee et al., News Analysis: Hong Kong’s First APA Case and How To 
Proceed from Here, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Feb. 28, 2013, at 1–2, available at LEXIS,
2013 WTD 40-7.
28. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Draft Senate Finance APA Report Shows
Incompetent IRS, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 22, 2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT
119-1; Richard C. Stark et al., Consistency, Sunshine, Privacy, Secret Law, and the APA 
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whether the Program can be effective in an environment in which the
time necessary to finalize an agreement has increased significantly since
the original APA Program’s inception.29  Also, the IRS’s recent abrupt 
cancellation of two APAs that it had entered into with Eaton Corporation 
has further decreased the Program’s corporate appeal.30  These events
correspond with a long running concern regarding a lack of information
about the Program, a problem that culminated in a congressional 
investigation that produced a complete draft report.31  Yet, this report
subsequently “vanished into thin air,”32 and calls for increased disclosure
regarding the Program persist.33 
This Comment examines the current state of the IRS’s handling of 
pricing agreements within the APMA Program, arguing that the IRS 
should improve the Program by increasing its transparency to coincide 
with the additional resources being devoted to the Program, the IRS’s
elevating transfer pricing enforcement, and the modern valuation challenges 
in transfer pricing.  Part II further introduces transfer pricing and the 
arm’s length standard, and Part III examines the recent performance of
the APMA Program.  Part IV explores the Program’s troubling lack of 
10; David D. Stewart, Practitioners Raise Concerns over Delays in IRS APA Program,
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, June 9, 2011, available at LEXIS, 2011 WTD 111-3; Shamik
Trivedi & Jaime Arora, Tech Company Tax Directors Question Appeal of APAs, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Nov. 14, 2012, available at LEXIS, 2012 TNT 220-6; Lynnley
Browning, The Tax Break that Corporate America Wants Kept Secret, CNN MONEY
(July 22, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/07/22/irs-corporate-tax-
deal/; Jeremy Scott, Shedding Light on Advance Pricing Agreements, TAXANALYSTS (July
22, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://www.taxanalysts.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/Permalink/JSCT-
99UL7R?OpenDocument.  The IRS recently consolidated the original stand-alone APA 
Program and the Service’s mutual agreement procedures into a single program within the 
Large Business and International Division titled the Advance Pricing and Mutual 
Agreement Program.  I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-38 (Mar. 27, 2012).  The procedures 
for obtaining an APA under the realigned program remain the same until the IRS issues 
updated guidance.  Id.  For this Comment, all references to the APMA Program are to
the Service’s processing and handling of APAs. 
29. Stewart, supra note 28. For further discussion of this concern and the Program’s 
improvements in 2012, see infra Part III.B.
30. Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: APA Cancellations Diminish IRS Program’s 
Appeal, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 16, 2012, available at LEXIS, 2012 TNT 136-2. 
31. See Lisa M. Nadal, News Analysis: Who Killed the Senate APA Report?, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Jan. 15, 2008, available at LEXIS, 2008 WTD 10-9. 
32. Id. 
33. See Lisa M. Nadal, Should Advance Pricing Agreements Be Disclosed?, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Sept. 10, 2008, available at LEXIS, 2008 WTD 176-12; Stark


















     







transparency.  Part V analyzes the legal and financial interests implicated by
improving the Program’s transparency, arguing that the Program should 
be improved by (1) amending Internal Revenue Code §§ 6103(b)(2) and 
6110 to allow disclosure of time-delayed redacted APAs to guide 
practitioners and address public concerns; (2) providing additional categories
of information within the APMA annual report, including examples of 
APAs from that year; and (3) adding a mandatory internal appeals process 
for the cancellation of APAs. Last, Part VI concludes that the Program
can better achieve its mission by adopting one or more of these proposals. 
II. THE MODERN CHALLENGES OF TRANSFER PRICING AND THE 
ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD
A. Basics of Transfer Pricing 
Transfer pricing is defined as the “pricing of intercompany transactions
that take place between affiliated businesses.”34  In other words, transfer 
prices are the amounts charged by one segment of a business when it
transfers physical goods and intangible property or provides services to
another associated business.35  To survive a possible audit or other transfer 
pricing scrutiny by the IRS, the companies’ price values must comport
with the arm’s length standard.36 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), an economic association of thirty-four member countries that 
produces international tax guidance and statistics,37 specifies when a
violation of the arm’s length standard occurs and what results: 
[if] conditions are made or imposed between the two associated enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be 
made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for 
those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise
and taxed accordingly.38 
34. MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 9 (quoting Robert Feinschreiber, Practical Aspects 
of Transfer Pricing, in TRANSFER PRICING HANDBOOK 2-1, 2-1 (Robert Feinschreiber ed.,
3d ed. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
35. OECD, supra note 26, at 19.  Under this definition, two businesses are 
associated if “one of the enterprises participates directly or indirectly in the management, 
control, or capital of the other” business.  Id.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2012). 
37. Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014); OECD Tax Database, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax- 
policy/tax-database.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
38. OECD, supra note 26, at 33 (quoting Model Tax Convention on Income and
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In other words, this standard requires that a transaction between two 
related or affiliated enterprises be conducted as if the businesses were 
unrelated or independent companies dealing in the open market.39  For  
example, say that American computer company Alpha sells smart phones 
assembled in Taiwan by its wholly owned subsidiary, Beta.  As Alpha
receives shipments of smart phones, it must set a price and “purchase” 
these goods from Beta, even though Alpha completely owns Beta.  This 
transfer price allows the IRS and Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance to tax
these goods as they change hands and territories. The arm’s length
principle applied here means that the smart phone transfer price must be 
similar to what a wholesale retail distributor would pay a neutral third-
party manufacturer for similar smart phones. Yet, this principle faces 
intense criticism because it assumes that a subsidiary can independently
negotiate and set a price normally determined by independent actors.40 
B. Methods of Determining Transfer Pricing 
There is widespread agreement that the arm’s length standard applied 
in such instances leaves significant room for uncertainty as to the proper 
transfer price for many transactions.41  With a multitude of variables that
could affect each transaction, proper prices are often difficult to determine 
for many goods and services, and they are even more challenging to 
pinpoint in cases where licenses and unique intangible property, such as 
patents and trademarks, are exchanged between related companies.42 
The first and most basic transfer pricing method is the comparable 
uncontrolled price method.43  Under this method, the transfer price is
compared with an amount charged in a comparable uncontrolled 
transaction.44  This transaction is also adjusted for differences between 
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
40. See Kleinbard, supra note 10, at 709 (criticizing the standard’s assumption
that a “wholly-owned subsidiary has a mind of its own with which to negotiate ‘arm’s-
length’ contractual terms with its parent” as one of several “fantastic notions” that countries
remarkably readily accept). 
41. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A
Proposal To Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 500 (2009). 
42. Id. 
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (as amended in 2012). 
44. Id. § 1.482-3(b)(1) (as amended in 2012).  For the majority of the APAs that
the Program executed in 2012, the required comparable data was acquired from Standard
and Poor’s Compustat database, with various other sources being used in appropriate 

































   
   
the quality and marketability of the compared products.45  From here, 
pricing methods under the arm’s length standard in the United States
become increasingly complex; these methods include the comparable 
profits method and various profit split methods.46  The variety of intricate
pricing methods leaves room for reasonable disagreement between the 
taxpayers and taxing authorities involved.47 
C. Intensifying Scrutiny
As mentioned above, the IRS has been recruiting a team of experts to
eliminate transfer pricing abuse.48  Also, by taking advantage of an
economic downturn that has made talent much more affordable, the IRS 
has hired additional employees to target transfer pricing, including 2000
employees in 2009 and 2010 to deal with general international issues.49 
In a further effort to improve enforcement of transfer pricing, the IRS 
has centralized and aggregated resources that were scattered across
multiple departments.50 
The effects of this escalation are already visible, with tax authority review
increasingly focusing on the transfer prices set for financial transactions 
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(2)(ii)(B) (as amended in 2012). 
46. Id. § 1.482-3(a)(1)–(5).  The comparable profits method instead focuses on 
financial ratios or profit level indicators “derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that
engage in similar business activities under similar circumstances.” Id. § 1.482-5(a) (as 
amended in 2012).  This method is applied by comparing the operating profit of one 
taxpayer with the profit of another party in a similar uncontrolled transaction to
determine an arm’s length price.  MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 108. This method, along
with a variation that focuses on net profit margins, was the transfer pricing method used
in seventy-five percent of the Program’s APAs involving tangible and intangible 
property in 2012.  I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 920.  It was also
used for fifty-five percent of the Program’s APAs involving services in 2012.  Id. at 921. 
For additional methods used in other tax jurisdictions and proposed new methods, see 
generally MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 94–132, for an in-depth discussion of the more
traditional transactional, profit-based, and profit split methods; OECD, supra note 26, 
listing various methods that the OECD accepts; Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 41, at 500, 
507, analyzing current methods based on profitability and proposing a new method; and 
Brauner, supra note 2, at 127. 
47. See Andrew B. Whitford, The Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence 
from Transfer Pricing Policy, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 269, 276–77 (2010). 
48. See supra note 19. 
49. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 20, at 5; Erb, supra note 19; Allen Smith, IRS, 
Global Taxing Enforcement Agencies Intensify Enforcement on Transfer Pricing, SOC’Y 
FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues/Federal 
Resources/Pages/TransferPricing.aspx. 
50. Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks at the 
IRS/George Washington University 24th Annual Institute on Current Issues in International
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made between subdivisions of a company.51  Tax authority review of
these transactions increased dramatically from 7% in 2007 to 42% in
2010.52 Further, reviews of transactions concerning services increased 
from 55% to 66% during the same time.53 Litigation, a very costly
byproduct of enforcement, is still uncommon and seen as a last resort
after mediation and arbitration.54 Litigation, however, is on the rise.55 
Additionally, tax authorities such as the IRS are armed with increasingly 
sophisticated investigatory methods, including the ability to extend the 
scope of a transfer pricing investigation beyond a single party to examine
the transfer price’s effect on the profit of the other party to the transaction 
and possibly the business’s full distribution chain.56 
III. ONE SOLUTION TO RISING ENFORCEMENT: ADVANCE 
PRICING AGREEMENTS
A. The APA Process in the IRS APMA Program 
An APA offers one potential solution for taxpayers trying to navigate 
the plethora of potential pitfalls involved in transfer pricing.57  The main
advantage of this agreement is that it eliminates uncertainty by making 
tax treatment for controlled transfers more predictable.58  This increased 
level of certainty improves the taxpayer’s ability to make strategic planning 
51. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 20, at 3. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id.; Peter Nias, Transfer Pricing and Dispute Resolution—The U.K. Experience, 
INT’L TAX J., Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 25, 29. 
55. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 20, at 3.  As evidence, the IRS is currently 
embroiled in transfer pricing litigation with several large U.S. companies. Patrick 
Temple-West, Amazon Fights $234 Million Tax Liability in Tax Court, REUTERS (Jan.
15, 2013, 5:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/15/net-us-usa-tax-amazon- 
idUSBRE90E0QY20130115; Patrick Temple-West, Brazil Royalties Dispute Lands 3M, 
IRS in U.S. Tax Court, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/04/03/us-usa-tax-3m-idUSBRE93214020130403; Patrick Temple-West, Eaton, IRS
Tangle over Cross-Border Pricing Pacts, REUTERS (June 17, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/17/us-usa-tax-court-eaton-idUSBRE85G0F420120617. 
56. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 20, at 6. 
57. Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 279, § 2.01. 
58. OECD, supra note 26, at 173. 
1015
 





























and financial decisions.59  An APA can also prevent costly and time-
consuming investigations and litigation, both for the taxpayer and the IRS.60 
A completed APA specifies what transactions will be covered, what
pricing methods will be used for those transactions, and what compliance
and reporting requirements the company must abide by.61 An APA can 
also be unilateral or bilateral.62  A unilateral APA is an agreement between 
the IRS and the taxpayer, and it provides shelter from only U.S. transfer 
pricing laws.63  Thus, a unilateral APA does not protect an entity from
the danger of double taxation.64  In contrast, a bilateral APA is negotiated 
between the taxpayer, the IRS, and the IRS equivalent in the other party’s
home country and will prevent double taxation.65 
Additionally, these agreements are kept confidential and not released 
to the public.66  Companies that have entered into an APA frequently do 
not admit that the agreement exists, and when companies do disclose an
agreement’s existence, shareholders are not provided with its details.67 
Returning to the example of Alpha’s smart phones, Alpha purchases 
assembled smart phones from its Taiwanese subsidiary, Beta, and Alpha 
first approaches the IRS to apply for a bilateral APA. The IRS then 
negotiates with the Ministry of Finance in Taiwan for both administrations
to agree on the best transfer pricing method for the transactions.  This 
agreement would protect Alpha from scrutiny on its transfer pricing 
methods as long as the company followed the Program’s reporting and
documentation guidelines.68  This agreement could then be renewed,
possibly applied to previous years for tax purposes, and even adjusted
during the tenure of the agreement if circumstances changed.69 
59. See MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
60. OECD, supra note 26, at 173. 
61. See Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 279, § 2.04. 
62. See I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805, 806. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. I.R.C. § 6103(a), (b)(2)(C) (2006) (providing that return information, which 
includes “any advance pricing agreement,” shall be confidential).
67. Browning, supra note 28; Scott, supra note 28. 
68. See Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 289, § 10.02 (providing that if the
taxpayer complies with the requirements and conditions of the APA, the Service “will 
not contest the application of” the agreed upon transfer pricing methodology). 
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B. Creation and Current State of the APMA Program 
The IRS has offered these agreements since 1991 through its APA and 
now APMA Program.70  The stated goal of the Program is to increase the
efficiency of tax administration by encouraging taxpayers to “work towards 
a mutual agreement in a spirit of openness and cooperation.”71  The  
Program is completely voluntary, although the IRS can take the initiative 
and approach a company to suggest an APA.72  Historically, the Program 
has been received positively by businesses, but it has also been consistently 
scrutinized by the public.73 
For example, in 2011, practitioners questioned the APA Program’s 
ability to complete agreements.74  Two trends from the APA Program’s 
annual reports validated these concerns. First, completion times for APAs
steadily increased each year, rising from an average of 33.7 months in 
2007 to 40.7 months in 2011.75  This trend occurred in spite of staff hours
spent on APAs increasing by 13,440 hours from 2007 to 2011.76  Second, 
the APA Program received significantly fewer applications from businesses
and completed fewer agreements in 2011 than in previous years.77  These 
fluctuations underscored practitioners’ concerns, and the APA Program’s
director acknowledged that as a result, some taxpayers “may have chosen to
forgo the process” in its entirety.78 
70. Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526 (establishing the original APA Program in 
1991).
71. Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 279, § 2.01. 
72. Id. § 2.05. 
73. See MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 237–38; supra note 28. 
74. See Stewart, supra note 28. 
75. I.R.S. Announcement 2008-27, 2008-15 I.R.B. 751, 757 tbl.2. From 2007 to 
2011, the average time in months to complete a new agreement or renewal was 33.7 in
2007, 34.7 in 2008, 37.9 in 2009, 37.2 in 2010, and 40.7 in 2011. See I.R.S.
Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805, 812; I.R.S. Announcement 2011-22, 2011-
16 I.R.B. 672, 679; I.R.S. Announcement 2010-21, 2010-15 I.R.B. 551, 558; I.R.S.
Announcement 2009-28, 2009-15 I.R.B. 760, 766; I.R.S. Announcement 2008-27, 2008-
15 I.R.B. 751, 757 tbl.2. 
76. See I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805, 810. 
77. Id. at 811 & tbl.1 (reporting that the Program received 96 applications and
completed 42 APAs in 2011); I.R.S. Announcement 2011-22, 2011-16 I.R.B. 672, 679 & 
tbl.1 (reporting that the Program received 144 applications and completed 69 APAs in
2010); I.R.S. Announcement 2010-21, 2010-15 I.R.B. 551, 558 & tbl.1 (reporting that 
the Program received 127 applications and completed 63 APAs in 2009). 

























    
    






Shortly thereafter, in early 2012, the IRS attempted to reduce
inefficiencies in the APA Program by moving it from the Office of Chief
Counsel to the Office of Transfer Pricing Operations, which is part of 
the IRS’s Large Business and International Division.79  In doing so, it
merged the APA Program’s staff with the Office of the U.S. Competent 
Authority’s employees, thereby forming the current APMA Program.80 
From the middle of 2011 through the end of 2012, the IRS also increased
the Program’s resources by expanding its staff by 35%.81 
In 2013, the IRS reported that these changes successfully improved the
Program’s ability to resolve APA cases.82  The Program’s subsequently
issued annual report confirmed this outcome, showing it had executed a
single-year high of 140 APAs in 2012.83  However, the average time to 
complete an APA still remains high at 41.7 months.84  The IRS also has 
391 APAs and 182 APA renewals pending for completion.85  Further, 
although the Program received 126 APA applications in 2012, this number
still fell short of the 144 applications the Program received in 2010.86 
Overall, the data shows that the Program’s ability to complete agreements is
improving but that participants still face lengthy processing times.87 
In addition to concerns over the Program’s ability to complete
agreements, the Program has been accused of unfair and discriminatory
treatment of businesses.88  Critics also assert that the IRS is applying 
79. I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 912. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. Kristen A. Parillo, New APMA Is a Success, Says IRS Official, WORLDWIDE 
TAX DAILY, Feb. 1, 2013, available at LEXIS, 2013 WTD 22-2. 
83. I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 911. 
84. Id. at 925 tbl.6. The introduction to the Program’s 2012 annual report states
that “[t]he average time to complete an APA decreased from 40.7 months in 2011 to 39.8 
months in 2012.” Id. at 911.  Yet, according to the report’s Table 6, the average time to 
complete an agreement is 41.7 months, whereas the median time to complete an agreement
is 39.8 months.  Id. at 925 tbl.6.  Consequently, when the equivalent statistics are compared, it
appears that both the median and average time to complete an agreement actually
increased from 2011 to 2012. Compare id. (reporting a combined average time of 41.7
months and a median time of 39.8 months), with I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16
I.R.B. 805, 812 tbl.2 (reporting a combined average time of 40.7 months and a median time
of 36.5 months). 
85. I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 915 tbl.2. 
86. Compare id. at 914 tbl.1, with I.R.S. Announcement 2011-22, 2011-16 I.R.B. 
672, 679 tbl.1. 
87. See supra notes 83–85. 
88. John B. Magee et al., GlaxoSmithKline Holdings Petitions Tax Court on 
Transfer Pricing Issues, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 2, 2004, available at LEXIS, 2004 
TNT 67-14 (discussing GlaxoSmithKline’s claim that it is entitled to a refund of its 
overpayment of tax plus interest in the amount of approximately $1 billion due to the 
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transfer pricing law too favorably to the large businesses that use the
Program.89 These accusations are amplified by the lack of disclosure within 
the Program.90  The concept of secret deals under the Program has been 
condemned as antithetical to the “democratic political values of the US.”91 
Therefore, one possible solution to make the APMA Program more
attractive to the public and interested taxpayers in this environment of 
heightened scrutiny and continued delays is to increase the Program’s
transparency. 
IV. TRANSPARENCY IN THE TAX ADMINISTRATION OF APAS 
Improving the degree of transparency within the APMA Program 
could both increase the attractiveness of the Program and reduce regulatory 
uncertainty in the enforcement of transfer prices.  Transparency is defined 
as “[o]penness; clarity; lack of guile and attempts to hide damaging 
information” and is commonly used in the context of financial disclosures, 
organizational policies and practices, and lawmaking where organizations 
interact with the public.92  Efforts to increase tax transparency are underway
at both the global and national levels of taxation.93  Indeed, the IRS has
pricing methodology); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: With Billions at Stake, 
Glaxo Puts APA Program on Trial, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 27, 2004, available at LEXIS,
2004 TNT 81-7 (reporting that GlaxoSmithKline alleged that the IRS discriminated against
the company in its transfer pricing enforcement).
89. Sheppard, supra note 28; Browning, supra note 28; Scott, supra note 28. 
90. See Browning, supra note 28 (reporting that because the details of APAs are 
not public, “[c]ritics argue that the process effectively creates a secret body of law, one that
might not be applied evenly across companies”).
91. MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 281. 
92. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1638 (9th ed. 2009); see also Robert M. Bushman 
et al., What Determines Corporate Transparency? 42 J. ACCT. RES. 207, 210 (2004)
(discussing the availability of financial disclosures and information about governance 
and accounting principles as a measure of transparency for publicly traded firms); Diane 
Dilanni, The Legal Framework of Transparency and Accountability Within the Context
of Privatization, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS, http://www.lwv.org/content/legal-framework-
transparency-and-accountability-within-context-privatization (discussing transparency in
“government proceedings, deliberations, decision-making and records”) (last visited Mar.
30, 2014). 
93. See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
FOR TAX PURPOSES: TAX TRANSPARENCY 2012 REPORT ON PROGRESS 7–8, 16–19 (2012),
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/Tax%20Transparency%202012_JM%20
MB%20corrections%20final.pdf (expressing the goals of 170 international delegate members 
for increasing the exchange of tax administration information); T. Keith Fogg, Transparency 












   









    
 





   
  
 






invoked this term when establishing new programs in the area of corporate 
taxation, and the Service is now calling for greater transparency in the 
context of international tax administration.94 
When the IRS uses the term transparency in a tax administration context, 
it is referring to the requirement that taxpayers reveal additional detailed
information about transactions on their tax returns that they anticipate 
the IRS may challenge.95  IRS auditors are then able to use this detailed 
information to maximize the collection of revenue by more easily identifying 
issues in a tax return.96  Yet, for taxpayers, transparency should carry an 
entirely different meaning.97  Transparency involves the ability of taxpayers
to perceive and understand the application of tax laws to their individual
circumstances.98  Also, increased levels of transparency throughout the
IRS allow taxpayers to perceive whether the IRS is adhering to the core 
tax policies of equality and proportionality.99 
Moreover, an abundance of secrecy and a lack of transparency contribute 
to taxpayers’ inability to predict how the IRS will apply the law to them,
creating regulatory uncertainty—a key decisionmaking factor that can
make or break companies and their leaders.100  The Program affords an
optimal opportunity for the IRS to reciprocate its call for transparency when 
considering the Program’s significant delays and continued concealment
of valuable regulatory applications of complex transfer pricing law to
specific taxpayer circumstances.101  In noting the increasing heightened
scrutiny that businesses are facing in transfer pricing situations, a former
tax policy director for the OECD expressed that “[y]ou don’t get good 
the amount of taxes collected on behalf of the United States and paid over to the IRS 
should be disclosed); Cheryl A. Kettler, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, What’s Transparency
After All?, 9 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 321, 321 (2011) (discussing the IRS’s recent
transparency-oriented uncertain tax positions program for large corporate taxpayers). 
94. See Kettler, supra note 93, at 321; Jaime Arora, APMA Director Calls for 
Increased Transparency and Responsiveness, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 3, 2012, available
at LEXIS, 2012 TNT 150-10. 
95. See Kettler, supra note 93, at 321. Tax administration is defined as the 
“management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execution and application of the 
internal revenue laws or related statutes.”  I.R.C. § 6103(b)(4) (2006). 
96. Kettler, supra note 93, at 321. 
97. See id. 
98. See Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX 
L. REV. 489, 494–95 (2011) (stating that tax administrators can play a significant role in 
reducing tax uncertainty).
99. See Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 567, 574 (1965) (defining the policy of proportionality as requiring that those who 
are equal in the relevant aspects bear equal tax burdens); see also United States v.
Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (“The Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax
another without some rational basis for the difference.”) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
100. See Whitford, supra note 47, at 269–70. 
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compliance just by enforcement.  You need to have better dialogue with
taxpayers.”102  The APMA Program is not transparent despite the IRS’s
annual release of reports on the Program, and the continued secrecy can 
be viewed as inconsistent with the IRS’s increasing emphasis on 
transparency in tax administration.103 
A. Statutory Grounds for Transparency and Disclosure of APA 
Information Within the APMA Program 
The IRS in its entirety is subject to minimum disclosure requirements 
mandated by federal statutes.104  The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requires that the IRS publish to the public specific information, including 
regulations, opinions and orders, and specifically requested agency
records.105 Congress passed the FOIA to encourage an “informed”
electorate and to provide private parties with the information needed to 
interact effectively with federal agencies such as the IRS.106  In addition
to desiring open administration, Congress was particularly concerned about 
parties who had to resort to litigating with “agencies on the basis of secret 
laws or incomplete information.”107  However, there are nine exemptions
to disclosure provided in the statute, including “exempt[ion] from disclosure 
by statute.”108  The primary statutory exemption affecting the IRS’s
disclosure of information under the broad-ranging FOIA is Internal Revenue 
Code § 6103, “Confidentiality and Disclosure of Returns and Return 
Information.”109  This statute provides that individual returns, and return
information for taxes, will be kept confidential.110  At the onset of the
102. Shamik Trivedi, Practitioners Call for More Business-Government Dialogue 
on Tax Reform, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 5, 2012, available at LEXIS, 2012 TNT 194-6
(internal quotation marks omitted).
103. See infra Part V.A.1. 
104. See generally IRS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) GUIDELINES 
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Freedom-of-Information-Act-(FOIA)-Guide
lines#appendixA (detailing how the FOIA applies to the Service and outlining the 
procedures for making information requests). 
105.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(3) (2006). 
106. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3, 7 (1965). 
107. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (quoting
Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
rev’d, 415 U.S. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
108.  5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(3) (2006). 
109.  I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2006). 


















   












original APA Program, the statute did not encompass APAs; it seemed 
that the FOIA could provide a glimpse into the secrecy of the APA 
Program.111 
B. Bureau of National Affairs Lawsuit and Aftermath
Under the guidance of these statutes, tax news publisher the Bureau of 
National Affairs (BNA) sued the IRS in federal court to compel disclosure 
of APAs.112  The organization hoped to publish APAs to its subscribers
for tax guidance.113  Prior to this case, the IRS treated APAs as subject to 
the confidentiality requirements in § 6103, but in the course of the litigation,
the IRS stipulated that APAs were in fact “rulings” on transfer pricing
issues.114  This admission made APAs written legal determinations for the
purposes of § 6610 and subject to disclosure to the general public.115 
Yet, Congress, under pressure from lobbying by corporate taxpayers 
concerned about privacy, quickly amended § 6103 to provide that APAs 
and related background information are excluded from the definition of 
written determinations under § 6110 and, instead, constitute confidential 
return information under § 6103.116  As a concession to the parties desiring 
more disclosure, Congress required the Department of the Treasury to
publish an annual report containing information regarding APAs and the 
APA Program.117 Although these annual reports provide the completion
time for agreements and the number of agreements completed, they do 
111. See infra Part IV.B.
112. Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc. v. IRS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 90, 91 (D.D.C. 1998). 
The BNA based this effort on the holding in a preceding case, where an appellate court 
held that the legal analysis in an IRS memorandum, apart from the taxpayer’s personal 
information, did not qualify as “return information” under the statutory exemption from 
FOIA disclosure in § 6103. See Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 608, 611, 616 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). This holding implied that the legal analysis of APAs, apart from any personal
information, would also not be protected from disclosure.  See Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc., 
24 F. Supp. 2d at 92–93. 
113. See Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d at 91–93. 
114. MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 280–81. 
115. See id. at 281. 
116. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 
106-170, § 521(a), § 6103, 113 Stat. 1860, 1925 (1999) (“[S]ection 6103(b) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (defining return information) is amended by . . . inserting 
. . . ‘any advance pricing agreement entered into by a taxpayer and the Secretary and any
background information related to such agreement or any application for an advance 
pricing agreement,’.”).
117. Id. § 521(b) (“Not later than 90 days after the end of each calendar year, the 
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not provide any numbers-based guidance on how the IRS applies transfer 
pricing regulations within these agreements.118 
Continued concerns over a lack of information, allegations of preferential 
treatment, and claims that the corporations within the APA Program
were not paying their fair share of taxes led the Senate Finance Committee 
to launch an investigation into the APA Program in December 2003.119 
In a letter to the IRS Commissioner, Senator Grassley requested undisclosed
information from the Program, including instances where the IRS waived
certain program requirements and rejected APA applications.120  In June
2005, a draft report was completed, but neither the report’s findings nor
any official details surrounding the investigation were released.121 In 
retrospect, the annual reports failed to quell the complaints over secrecy
within the Program.122  Rather, the IRS’s own push for tax administration
transparency, the Service’s increasing pressure on taxpayers to comply
with complex transfer pricing rules, and the public’s concerns with the 
APA process necessitate the consideration of proposals to increase the
Program’s transparency.123 
V. ANALYZING PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY
IN THE APMA PROGRAM
The Program’s minimal level of transparency could be improved through
various changes to the Program’s disclosure and reporting requirements. 
Possible changes include releasing redacted pricing agreements, expanding 
the administrative and substantive information disclosed within the
Program’s annual reports, and requiring the IRS’s Office of Appeals to
review and share detailed information with a taxpayer before making the
rare decision to cancel or revoke a taxpayer’s APA.124  The first two 
118. I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 911 (“This fourteenth report 
describes the experience, structure, and activities of the APA Program during calendar year 
2012.  It does not provide guidance regarding the application of the arm’s length standard.”).
119. Nadal, supra note 31. 
120. See Letter from Sen. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., to Mark Everson, 
Comm’r, IRS (Dec. 22, 2003), available at U.S. Lawmakers Ask IRS if Multinationals 
Pay ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 23, 2003, available at LEXIS,
2003 WTD 246 246-12. 
121. Nadal, supra note 31. 
122. Id.
 123. Id.; supra notes 19–20, 28. 































proposals focus on increasing transparency primarily from the public’s 
perspective, whereas the third proposal focuses on increasing transparency
for the Program’s participants.125 
A. Amend §§ 6103(b)(2) and 6610 To Allow       
Disclosure of Redacted APAs 
The most desirable way to improve transparency within the APMA
Program is for the IRS to disclose the detailed pricing agreements that the
Program creates with individual taxpayers.126  Releasing these agreements
could have several practical and abstract benefits, including revealing
whether the IRS is being consistent with taxpayers not using the APMA 
Program and providing practical guidance for taxpayers seeking to reduce
regulatory uncertainty.127  But releasing these agreements also involves
concerns regarding disclosing private information, possibly reducing the 
effectiveness of the Program, and imposing new disclosure requirements 
that could affect precious Program resources.128 
1. Benefits of Disclosing Redacted APAs 
First, releasing agreements would comport with an increasing emphasis
on top-down transparency in the federal government’s administrative 
agencies.  Congress and taxpayers are striving to require executive agencies
to release more information to the general public.129  For example, in an
effort to increase transparency further, Congress passed the Openness 
Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007, amending
125. See infra Part V.A–C. 
126. See Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc. v. IRS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 90, 91 (D.D.C. 1998); 
Press Release, Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc., BNA Sues IRS for Release of Advance Pricing
Agreement Information (Feb. 28, 1996), available at LEXIS, 96 TNT 42-39 (asserting 
that not disclosing the information within APAs to the public “constitutes a private tax
system” where a few law or accounting firms may gain “exclusive rights to [the] IRS’
ruling position on dynamic areas of tax law”).  This possibility was subsequently
considered but rejected in Nadal, supra note 33, and more broadly advocated for in Stark 
et al., supra note 28. 
2524, 2524–25 (finding that Congress should “regularly review” the FOIA to “determine 
127. See infra Part V.A.1.
 128. See infra Part V.A.2. 
129. See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 2, 121 Stat. 
whether further changes and improvements are necessary to ensure that the Government
remains open and accessible to the American people and is always based not upon the
‘need to know’ but upon the fundamental ‘right to know’”); see also Federal Funding
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-282, § 2(b), 120 Stat. 
1186, 1187 (mandating that a searchable website that is accessible to the public be 
created to disclose for each federal award the name of the entity receiving the award, the 
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the FOIA to provide for more disclosure of executive agency information.130 
This Act broadened the scope of information available to the public by
altering the definition of agency record and requiring agencies such as
the IRS to list the specific statutory exemption claimed for each deletion 
in disclosed documents.131  Also, the executive branch stated that agencies
generally must be more transparent to “promote[] accountability by
providing the public with information” and improve “the quality of
government information available to the public.”132  Because the APMA 
Program is a component of an executive agency,133 these policies favor
requiring broader disclosure within the Program as well. Additionally,
given the very “large amounts negotiated in APAs, which often involve
very large corporate taxpayers,” the agreements’ secrecy amplifies the
130. 121 Stat. 2524, 2524 (“An Act [t]o promote accessibility, accountability, and 
openness in Government by strengthening . . . the Freedom of Information Act . . . .”). 
131. See id. at 2530–31; Congress Passes Amendments to the FOIA, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. OFF. INFO. & PRIVACY, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiapost/2008foiapost9.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014).  In another example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 required a website to be created to “foster greater accountability and
transparency in the use of covered funds.”  Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1526(a), 123 Stat. 115, 
293. The website allows users to track where the Act’s funds are spent down to the zip
code level and also provides the option for the public to report potential fraud, waste, and
abuse of funds. Where Is the Money Going?, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/
arra/Transparency/Pages/WhereIsTheMoneyGoing2.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
132. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 1–3 (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf. Despite these efforts,
the federal government still faces continued criticism for a lack of transparency and 
consistently faces lawsuits that push the boundaries of the FOIA.  See Josh Levs & Carol 
Cratty, Court Considers Demand that U.S. Release Photos of Bin Laden’s Body, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/10/world/bin-laden-photos/index.html (last updated Jan.
10, 2013, 1:59 PM) (describing a federal appeal by a conservative legal group to gain 
access using the FOIA to at least some of the fifty-two images taken of Osama bin 
Laden’s body after his death).  In another example, citizens have tried to use the FOIA to 
obtain any of their personal data being stored by the National Security Administration
through its PRISM electronic surveillance program.  Jeff Larson, NSA: Responding to 
This FOIA Would Help “Our Adversaries,” PROPUBLICA (June 25, 2013, 2:57 PM), http://
www.propublica.org/article/nsa-responding-to-this-foia-would-help-our-adversaries. In 
fact, the number of FOIA filings has “surged” since President Obama took office,
arguably because the administration is not living up to its goals.  Dave Boyer, Court
Filings Surge in FOIA Cases During Obama Years, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/24/court-filings-surge-in-foia-cases-durin
g-obama-yea/?page=all. 
133. See The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/ 
uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last updated Feb. 12, 2014) (“The IRS




























     
 
      
  
argument that the Program should be more transparent and subject to 
government scrutiny and oversight.134 
Further, the IRS is calling for more transparency from corporations 
and taxpayers in the APMA Program but is largely unable to reciprocate 
this call under Congress’s statutory exemption.135 With this statutory 
bar, the IRS has said that there is no plan to increase the Program’s
transparency.136  But because transparency is mutually beneficial only 
when it runs in both directions, the IRS should reciprocate by releasing
agreements to further its own call for transparency.137  Without doing so,
the IRS’s push for more transparency from corporations and taxpayers is 
subject to the same limiting criticism of being only a “two-way mirror,” 
a criticism that has been leveled recently at other IRS corporate tax 
programs.138  If this is the case, taxpayers will surrender more information 
to the IRS and therefore lighten the challenges in enforcing tax laws
but will not receive any real benefit themselves.139  Rather, when the IRS 
releases more information, taxpayers are able to perceive how the Program 
applies transfer pricing laws, which can decrease tax law uncertainty for
them.140  Reducing tax law uncertainty is valuable because taxpayers
may view highly uncertain tax law as “fundamentally unfair” and as a result
may make a greater effort to avoid paying their required taxes.141 
On this basis, providing more information could address claims of 
unfairness, which undermine the very purpose of the APMA Program by 
leading to litigation.142  This danger is illustrated by GlaxoSmithKline
Holdings (Americas) Inc. v. Commissioner, in which British pharmaceutical
company GlaxoSmithKline (Glaxo) contested a $2.6 billion transfer 
pricing deficiency that the IRS assessed against it for the years 1989 to
1996.143  Glaxo was not using an APA, but the company obtained
confidential APA information of a previous direct pharmaceutical
134. Nadal, supra note 31. 
135. See Arora, supra note 94; see supra note 116. 
136. Nadal, supra note 31. 
137. See Kettler, supra note 93, at 321–22 (referencing the requirement for large 
corporate taxpayers to report uncertain tax positions). 
138. See id.
 139. Id. at 321 (arguing that the IRS’s concept benefits the Service but “fails to 
enhance the taxpayer’s understanding of a tax code that has become increasingly difficult 
to understand and apply”). 
140. See Osofsky, supra note 98, at 494–95. Tax law uncertainty is defined as “any
type of tax law question that a taxpayer cannot definitely resolve based on the available 
tax law authority.” Id. at 493. 
141. Id. at 524. 
142. See Petition, GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. v. Comm’r, No. 5750-04
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competitor that was in similar transfer pricing circumstances.144 The 
company alleged that the IRS discriminated against it based on differences
in how the IRS applied transfer pricing regulations to its transactions
versus its direct competitors’.145  Similar to the suit by the BNA, Glaxo 
attempted to use the court system to pressure the IRS and compel
judicial discovery of advance pricing agreement information to support its
claims.146  Yet, the IRS successfully blocked this attempt as a result of the
statutory amendment discussed above.147 Glaxo and the IRS ultimately 
settled for $3.4 billion but only after the lawsuit and Glaxo’s allegations
renewed scrutiny of the APA Program’s lack of transparency.148  Yet, with 
Glaxo’s settlement, there is no way of obtaining additional information 
regarding APAs to determine whether taxpayers are indeed being treated
differently under transfer pricing laws. 
Increased transparency is one potential answer to the claim Glaxo 
raised—a taxpayer is being treated differently under transfer pricing laws.149 
A taxpayer not participating in the APMA Program needs to know “how 
it was treated in the traditional administrative process and then compare
the results” to businesses in similar circumstances that use the Program
to establish transfer prices.150  If a business using the APMA Program was
able to take advantage of a methodology not available to the traditional 
taxpayer, then there is a “serious concern that the difference was
inappropriate” because of a lack of equivalent treatment for businesses
outside of the Program.151  Improving transparency by releasing agreements
144. See Sullivan, supra note 88. Glaxo acquired this confidential APA information
after it merged with SmithKline in 2001.  Id.  Both companies applied for APAs in the 
1990s. Id. Thereafter, the IRS executed SmithKline’s APA, but Glaxo alleged that the
IRS refused to act on its application. Id.
 145. Id.
 146. See Mary Ann Cohen, Glaxo Moves To Compel Discovery; IRS Moves To Compel 
Production, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 9, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 46-9. 
147. See Theodore J. Kletnick et al., IRS Asserts Sanctions Inappropriate; Can’t 
Reveal Taxpayer Information, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 16, 2006, available at LEXIS,
2006 TNT 51-20; supra note 116. 
148. Nutt, supra note 5. 
149. Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing 
Agreements and the Struggle To Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 143, 203–04 (2000). 
150. See id. at 203. 
151. See id.  Specifically, if all businesses and taxpayers have access to redacted
APAs, then they would be able to “monitor [them] on their own behalf and point out . . . 




































would help ensure that taxpayers are being treated fairly.  Further, making
the agreements public would remove the incentive for companies to resort 
to litigation in the hopes of gathering additional information to claim
unfairness.152 
Alternatively, these agreements may indeed show that companies in 
similar situations are being treated differently under the same transfer 
pricing regulations.  If that is the case, then increased transparency through 
more disclosure will spur the Program not only to adhere to its original
goal of openness but also to comport with policies against inequality in 
taxation.153  Several reasons amplify the need for equality in this context.
At the outset, unequal treatment in transfer pricing could potentially amount 
to a difference of millions, even billions, of dollars.154  Additionally, the
Program’s fees and likely accompanying tax professional fees and expert
opinion fees make the Program unavailable to many taxpayers.155  Last, 
some of the largest and most influential multinational corporations’ use 
of APAs in conjunction with elaborate tax strategies magnifies the potential
for other corporations to be competitively disadvantaged by unequal tax 
treatment.156 
Second, the information contained within APAs would provide practical 
guidance for practitioners and taxpayers.  Parties in favor of disclosing 
APAs argue that they are the “working law” of the IRS on transfer pricing
issues.157  Again, a challenging part of setting a transfer price is meeting 
the IRS’s requirement that taxpayers secure relevant pricing data from 
similar transactions or situations to justify their chosen transfer pricing
method.158  Since the Program’s inception, the IRS has completed over 
one thousand agreements that would be potentially subject to release.159 
These agreements would provide a new source of data that would help
companies meet this requirement.  Disclosing this information would help
152. See Cohen, supra note 146. 
153. See supra notes 71, 99 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text; see also OECD, supra note 26, at 
19 (“Transfer prices are significant for both taxpayers and tax administrations because
they determine in large part the income and expenses, and therefore taxable profits, of 
associated enterprises in different tax jurisdictions.”).
155. See Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 284–85, § 4.12 (listing the required 
fees for APA requests). 
156. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text; see also Kleinbard, supra note 
10, at 702, 707–13 (outlining Google’s complex tax strategy, which uses an APA and 
also noting that the advantage it creates is “not available to wholly domestic firms”).
157. Nadal, supra note 33; Letter from Thomas F. Field, President & Publisher, 
Tax Analysts, to Rep. Bill Archer, Chairman, House Ways & Means Comm. (June 2, 
1999), available at LEXIS, 1999 TNT 106-11.
158.  Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 281, § 4.03. 
159. I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 915 tbl.2 (stating that the 
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taxpayers learn about the IRS’s favored methods and other nuances in
terms of how the IRS evaluates transfer pricing issues as it encounters 
them.160 
Moreover, as transfer pricing valuations increasingly shift to cover 
intangible property, where there is a very limited number of comparable 
transactions, the completed APAs could provide a trove of information
on how the IRS is accommodating these types of exchanges.161  Valuing 
the exchange of an intangible such as a patent or trade secret is particularly
difficult because it may have no book value on the company’s balance
sheet and may also exhibit special characteristics that make finding 
comparable transactions or situations difficult.162  From 2010 to 2012,
approximately sixty-eight agreements covering high-value transactions 
were completed that dealt specifically with the exchange and use of
intangible property.163  These agreements could help other parties set their 
own transfer prices in line with the IRS’s consideration of previous transfer 
pricing transactions, in turn lowering the regulatory uncertainty surrounding 
transfer pricing law.  If taxpayers could comport with the IRS’s transfer
pricing methods at the outset, then that could also prevent costly 
investigations and litigation over transfer prices.
Last, releasing pricing agreement information would make the Program
more accountable to the electorate and the public, which would restore 
confidence in the Program. The press reported that leaked information 
from the Senate Finance Committee investigation revealed that  “[t]he 
160. See Nadal, supra note 33. 
161. See Brauner, supra note 2, at 81; see also Julie Martin, Maruca Outlines IRS 
Approach to Transfer Pricing, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 19, 2013, available at LEXIS, 
2013 TNT 33-7 (reporting that the IRS is concerned about intangible transactions where
there are typically no comparables for the types of assets).
162. OECD, supra note 26, at 195–96. 
163. See I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 915 tbl.2, 919 (indicating 
that eighteen percent of the 140 executed APAs, or approximately twenty-five APAs,
involved the use of intangible property); I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 
805, 819 tbl.14 (indicating that thirteen agreements of this type were completed in 2011); 
I.R.S. Announcement 2011-22, 2011-16 I.R.B. 672, 685 tbl.14 (indicating that thirty
agreements of this type were completed in 2010).  The Service is committed to handling
these types of challenging transactions within the Program, stating that
[w]hile complex transactions involving intangibles may be more challenging in 
some cases than other types of transactions, and represent a smaller percentage 
of the APA inventory than the other types of transactions, the IRS will continue to
seek opportunities to work with taxpayers and treaty partners to provide prospective 
certainty for such transactions wherever appropriate.



















   









problem, as the draft report points out using case studies (drawn from 
real cases), is that the program is badly managed, and the IRS is giving
away the store” within the APA Program.164  This leaked excerpt aligns
with the core of the Senate’s concern regarding whether the APA Program
is “an effective tool in the efforts to enforce” transfer pricing regulations.165 
Although this draft report subsequently disappeared, questions regarding
the Program’s lack of transparency toward the taxpaying public and the 
tax press remain: “How aggressively does the IRS negotiate APAs with 
corporate taxpayers?” and “Do U.S. tax officials fear an outcry from 
corporate multinationals who have finally found a way around their 
transfer pricing headaches?”166  Releasing agreements could resolve
continued concerns that prompted the launch of the original investigation. 
Pricing agreements could be compared with transfer pricing assessments
outside of the Program to see whether the IRS is indeed “giving away
the store” from the perspective of the public and the general taxpayer.167 
This increased transparency would serve as a check against mismanagement
of the Program, allowing tax policy advocates and members of the 
electorate to make more informed decisions about the direction of the 
APMA Program in an environment of increasingly complex transactions
and elevated transfer pricing scrutiny.
2. Concerns over Releasing Agreements 
Aside from increasing the Program’s transparency, disclosing pricing 
agreements to the public generates several concerns.  These potential 
disadvantages include chilling participation in the Program, consuming
precious resources to implement the disclosure policy, and damaging the
usefulness of APAs overall. 
At the outset, any change in the IRS’s disclosure policies faces an uphill 
battle against a presumption that the privacy interests of the taxpayer
outweigh the benefits of disclosure.168  Accordingly, the predominant
concern cited for not disclosing APAs is the fear that potentially
compromising privacy would chill taxpayer participation.169  Participation 
would arguably be chilled because once APAs are released, the public
will want to see more documents after realizing that not enough information 
is revealed through an APA alone.170  These background documents, used 
164. Sheppard, supra note 28. 
165. See Letter from Sen. Grassley, supra note 120. 
166. Nadal, supra note 31. 
167. See Sheppard, supra note 28. 
168. See Fogg, supra note 93, at 782–83. 
169. MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 281. 
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to support the taxpayer’s position in the APA, would include valuable 
proprietary information and other sensitive business information, further 
compromising taxpayer privacy.171  When the IRS originally planned to
release APAs during the BNA lawsuit, Program participants acted on
this fear and filed amicus curiae briefs in the lawsuit opposing disclosure.172 
These participants expressed fear that sensitive material would now
immediately be made public, jeopardizing the entire Program, and then 
engaged in the successful lobbying of Congress after it appeared that the 
IRS would release the APAs.173 But in aiming to disclose APAs, the valid 
concern over the privacy of sensitive business information could be
mitigated through several precautions, including the release of agreements 
subject to protective procedures and time delay.
First, agreements could be released under the procedures laid out in 
§ 6110, in the same way that the IRS releases “private letter rulings” to the 
public.174  This provision would provide cautionary protections for the
personal information contained within APAs, which supply important
applications of revenue laws.175  These protections include exempting 
identifying details of the parties involved, trade secrets, commercial or
financial information obtained from a person, privileged or confidential 
information, and information where disclosure “would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”176  Under this disclosure 
scheme, the IRS would release only the APA document and would not 
release background documents that potentially contain proprietary and
sensitive business information.177  Further, § 6110 requires notice to be
sent to the parties to the agreement and allows the parties to restrain
disclosure if they disagree with any failure to remove identifying
information that would compromise their right to privacy.178  These 
provisions could be aptly applied to APAs because they similarly contain a
mix of private information, numerical data, and discretionary applications 
171. Id.
 172. Id.; Letter from Thomas F. Field, supra note 157. 
173. Nadal, supra note 33. 
174. See I.R.C. § 6110 (2006) (outlining appropriate procedures for the public 
inspection of written determinations); see also Press Release, Bureau of Nat’l Affairs,
Inc., supra note 126 (describing the effort in the 1970s to obtain disclosure of “private
letter rulings”); Letter from Thomas F. Field, supra note 157.
175.  I.R.C. § 6110(c); Letter from Thomas F. Field, supra note 157. 
176. I.R.C. § 6110(c).
177. See id.




   
  
 
     
 
   
    














    
 
  
   
 
   
 
  
     
of transfer pricing law to that information.179  The parties involved under 
these procedures would be given an opportunity to review the redacted
APA before it is released to the public.180  An additional safeguard would be
allowing concerned businesses an opportunity to contest disclosure of
their APAs under § 6110 if privileged information is not properly redacted
from the agreement.181  The public may still want access to background 
information; however, the documents containing background information
would predominantly include confidential business or financial 
information.182 Therefore, the advantage of providing guidance would
likely be outweighed by concerns for taxpayer privacy.  Additionally, the 
volume of documents used for an APA request would, by itself, make
redaction of background documents arguably impractical.183 
Second, another possibility would be to delay the release of agreements
for a period to mitigate concerns that proprietary information could be 
misused.184  The foundation for this type of delay can be seen in other IRS
procedures including subsection (g) of § 6110.185  This subsection applies a
baseline delay requirement of seventy-five days after the notice of pending 
disclosure is mailed to the parties.186  An additional 180-day delay is also 
available if supplemental requirements are met.187 
The executive branch employs similar time delays to protect sensitive 
classified information possessed by the government under the rationale
of protecting national security.188  As an example of a delay requirement
on the opposite end of the spectrum, Executive Order 13526 requires 
executive agencies to declassify all documents after twenty-five years
179. See Press Release, Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc., supra note 126 (comparing 
APAs to “private letter rulings” because the agreements contain “written determinations 
that multinational corporations use to calculate their U.S. taxable income”).
180. See I.R.C. § 6110(f); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 416 F. Supp. 2d 119, 123 (D.D.C. 
2006) (“Section 6110 grants the Secretary discretion to redact portions of otherwise
public advice in accordance with the exemptions provided under the FOIA.”)
181. See I.R.C. § 6110(f). 
182. See Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 280–82, § 4.03(2), (5), (7), (9), (10)
(including income tax returns, pricing and distribution agreements, and company business 
plans as background documents subject to data collection for forming an APA). 
183. See id. § 4.03 (listing the additional documentary requirements for requesting
an APA).
184. This proposal is adopted from a broader suggestion in Stark et al., supra note
28, and is further analyzed here. 
185.  I.R.C. § 6110(g) (2006). 
186. Id. § 6110(g)(1)(A). 
187. Id. § 6110(g)(4).
188. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Order 13526- Classified
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unless they fall under one of the nine exemptions outlined in the order.189 
To protect privacy while releasing pricing agreements, the IRS could 
adopt similar safeguards.  For instance, to safeguard most sensitive
information within the agreements, the IRS could release a business’s 
APA after a two- to three-year delay period following the agreement’s
expiration. A longer period of ten years has also been suggested, albeit 
for disclosure of the APA and all of its background documents.190  The 
advantage to this type of delay is that the information in the agreements 
would be less sensitive or useful for competitors if they were able to
identify the involved parties.  For example, an APA and its appendices can
include sensitive internal pricing and profitability information regarding a
business’s specific products.191  By delaying the release of a redacted 
agreement, this information would potentially be out of date and less useful 
to a competitor that was able to identify the company party to the APA 
despite the redactions.192  If a set time frame of several years is not long 
enough to have this effect, then the burden could be placed on the company
to use the procedures under § 6110 to request a longer delay period.193 
Additionally, with the APMA Program having completed agreements since
the early 1990s, many APAs that were completed in the early years of the 
original APA Program have not been renewed and are likely now free 
from many of the privacy concerns.194 
Yet, the disadvantage of this ancillary safeguard is that the information 
released would be less useful to practitioners and interested businesses if
the application of pricing laws or the regulations themselves have
changed since the completion of the agreement.  Despite this disadvantage,
time-delayed agreements would still serve to allay the concerns over 
unfairness and mismanagement within the Program.  Indeed, the tax
treatment in the agreements could be compared with the treatment received
by businesses not covered by an APA during the same time period. 
189. Id.
190.  Stark et al., supra note 28. 
191. See I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-1 I.R.B. 1 app. A at 68–70 (including an
example APA that contains “Appendix A,” which in an actual agreement, could include
the internal operating margin and cost information of the business’s products). 
192. See Stark et al., supra note 28 (advocating for the eventual disclosure of
unredacted agreements). 
193. See supra note 178. 
194. See I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 923, 925 (reporting
that eighty percent of the APAs executed in 2012 are designed to last between five and 






































Further, the Service faces practical challenges by releasing agreements
because of an engrained tension between “balancing efficiency on one
hand with participation, transparency and accountability on the other.”195 
With the Program already experiencing significant delays in processing
agreements,196 the requirement that an employee redact these agreements
would consume additional resources. Moreover, if the agreements are
released with the detailed procedural protections adopted from § 6110,197 
then additional human capital would have to be allocated to handle requests 
for further redactions and challenges from businesses contesting the
disclosure of their pricing agreements.  A business could also file suit to 
block disclosure under the scheme of § 6110, potentially consuming even
more of the Program’s precious resources.198 
However, it is an ideal time for the IRS to implement these requirements 
because the IRS has finished realigning the original APA Program into
the current APMA Program.199 In addition, the IRS already has personnel
and policies for complying with disclosures under the FOIA and § 6110.200 
The IRS could also pass some of the costs on to the users of the 
information, similar to how the IRS handles standard FOIA requests.201 
For these requests, the IRS employs a “FOIA Fee Schedule” to recoup 
copying, searching, and reviewing charges from the users requesting the 
information.202 Furthermore, resources consumed on releasing agreements
could be offset or outweighed by the prevention of costly transfer pricing 
litigation and investigations.  This decrease in litigation and investigations
would result from providing practical information to taxpayers not using
the APMA Program.  These taxpayers could use this information to better 
align their own transfer pricing positions with other taxpayers’ positions that
are approved by the IRS within the Program.  Additionally, by delaying the
releases by a few years, the IRS would have more time to make the
redactions and address the concerns over a particular APA because the
IRS would give a business ample notice that its APA is going to be released. 
195. See Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and 
Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 532 (2012).
196. See I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805, 808. 
197. See I.R.C. § 6110(c) (2006). 
198. Id. § 6110(f)(3) (2006). 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
200. See Today’s IRS Organization, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Today's-IRS-
Organization (last updated Mar. 11, 2014) (including the “Office of Privacy, Governmental 
Liaison and Disclosure” as part of the Service’s Operations Support Unit). 
201. See IRS, supra note 104. 
202. Id. (providing a table that divides the Service’s FOIA costs into fees for
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As an additional concern, a fear exists that a new disclosure policy for 
APAs would result in “homogenized” agreements that are less responsive to
the complex needs of multinational businesses.203  The argument is that
taxpayers would mimic the published agreements and that APAs would
then lose their value as a more specialized application to a single taxpayer’s
circumstances.204  This concern could again be offset by the requirement 
that APAs be released on a delay.  Releasing agreements on a delay would 
help prevent mimicking because an agreement’s underlying circumstances, 
including the relevant economic conditions and risks of the covered
transactions, could change after several years.205  Also, although users could 
view how the IRS applied transfer pricing law to the redacted business’s
circumstances in the previous years, the Service would still craft a new 
agreement to the taxpayer’s specific circumstances based on the extensive 
information that the taxpayer must provide to the Service during the 
application and negotiation process.206 
B. Release Additional Information in the Program’s Annual Report 
A supplemental or alternative improvement would be to produce more
detailed and specific reports on the APMA Program.207 An advantage of
this proposal is that it could be implemented without amending the 
203. MARKHAM, supra note 9, at 282. 
204. See id. at 282–83. 
205. See Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 281, § 4.03 (requiring a program 
applicant to provide for each party to the controlled transactions a current detailed analysis
of the “(a) functions and economic activities performed; (b) the assets employed; (c) the 
economic costs incurred; (d) the risks assumed; (e) relevant contractual terms; (f) relevant 
economic conditions; and (g) relevant non-recognition transactions”). That these 
circumstances can change and require a shift in the IRS’s position from one taxable year 
to the next is evident from the Service’s ability to assess adjustments against a taxpayer
when the actual transactions do not fit into the agreed upon transfer pricing method.  Id.
§ 11.02.
206. Id. § 4.  The IRS requires “[r]epresentative financial and tax data” from the
parties to the agreement, which includes specific information from parties’ income tax returns;
financial statements; annual reports to shareholders, pricing and licensing agreements;
marketing and financial studies; and company-wide projections, business plans, and
profitability reports. Id. § 4.03(10). 
207. See Nadal, supra note 33; see also Stark et al., supra note 28 (suggesting that
the content of the reports should be reconsidered to adhere more closely to the original 
intention of the compromise underlying the report feature).  This proposal is modified
here based on the IRS’s changes to the Program’s reports and is supplemented with
suggestions for new report content based in part on the inquiries from the failed Senate 










    





   
  
  










   
  
 
statute barring expansive disclosure of APAs.208  Section 521 of the Ticket
to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 states that the 
Program’s annual report “shall include the following for the calendar
year to which such report relates: (A) Information about the structure, 
composition, and operation of the advance pricing agreement program
office.”209  The statute, however, does not specify that the listed categories
of information are the only ones allowed to be published in the yearly
report.210  As plainly stated by the current annual reports, the reports do
not actually “provide guidance regarding the application of the arm’s length
standard.”211 The Program’s reports largely contain administrative
information about the Program.212  This proposal is also pertinent because in
2013, the IRS decreased the amount of descriptive information provided 
in the Program’s annual reports, further limiting the Program’s 
transparency.213 
The most basic improvement to the reporting system would be to publish 
example APAs.  The current report format includes a model agreement
with empty fields but does not include any examples.214  The report also 
includes in its appendices the supplemental forms defining the transactions
covered and the critical assumptions that the transfer pricing agreement
208. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2006) (listing general rules regarding the confidentiality
and disclosure of returns and return information). 
209. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 
106-170, § 521(b)(2), 113 Stat. 1860, 1925–27. 
210. See id.
211. I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 911; accord § 521(b)(3),
113 Stat. at 1927–28 (providing that “the reports shall not include information—
(A) which would not be permitted to be disclosed under section 6110(c) of such Code if
such report were a written determination as defined in section 6110 of such Code; or 
(B) which can be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular 
taxpayer”).
212. See generally I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911; I.R.S. 
Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805. 
213. Compare I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 911–39 (omitting 
information about the types of services covered by transfer pricing transactions from the 
Program’s 2012 annual report), with I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805,
820 tbl.15 (categorizing the types of services covered in the transfer pricing transactions, 
which varied from warranty services to marketing, in the Program’s 2011 annual report). 
Similarly, the 2011 report described the types of functions performed by the tested party
under the APAs, but this information is also not included in the 2012 report.  Compare
I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, with I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 
2012-16 I.R.B. 805, 821.  Further, in many areas of the 2012 report, the Service opted
for graphical representations that improve the report’s readability, but the Service did not 
provide the underlying data tables found in previous reports. Compare I.R.S. Announcement 
2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 916–25, with I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B.
805, 813–27. 
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relies upon.215  These appendices could be improved by providing additional
examples of the underlying forms, including hypothetical transactions 
and the accompanying financial calculations.  Although parties interested 
in obtaining an APA are often large businesses that seek specialized tax 
advice, example agreements would still be helpful to smaller taxpayers 
that continue to confront transfer pricing issues.216 
Another suggested improvement is to release specific information for 
each of the industry categories that the Program formed specialized
teams of employees to address.217  Because these categories were created 
based on the “commonality of issues to warrant their assignment to teams,”
these areas might lend themselves to more standardized guidance
information that could be produced in the reports by industry.218  In the
Program’s 2012 annual report, however, the IRS no longer included 
information on its industry-specific teams, which had been relied upon to
craft this proposal.219  Yet, the report still divides the number of executed
APAs into six broad industries, providing an exact number of completed
APAs for each category.220  Therefore, this proposal could be adapted to 
these categories, with the IRS releasing more detailed information for 
each one and potentially any major subcategories.221  As an example, the
2012 report shows that in the manufacturing industry, the Program 
completed eighteen APAs covering computer and electronic products, 
eleven covering chemical products, and eight covering transportation
215. Id. apps. A–E at 931–38. 
216. Nadal, supra note 31. 
217. Nadal, supra note 33. 
218. Id. (quoting I.R.S. Announcement 2007-31, 2007-12 I.R.B. 769, 773) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
219. See I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 911–39 (omitting
reference to industry-specific teams); Nadal, supra note 33 (listing the categories of cases 
handled by specific teams in 2007).  For example, the Program’s 2011 annual report 
stated that the “APA Program selected five categories of cases for specialization —cases
involving cost sharing agreements, financial products, the semiconductor industry, the
automotive industry, and the pharmaceutical industry.”  I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 
2012-16 I.R.B. 805, 810.
220. I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 916 tbl.4 (listing the 
number of APAs finalized or renewed in the following industries: manufacturing; wholesale 
and retail trade; management; services; finance, insurance, and real estate; and natural 
resources and transportation).  In previous years, the Service shared more specific information 
about the Program by detailing the industries’ APAs covered by their North American
Industry Classification System codes. See I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 
805, 818 tbl.12 (listing in detail twenty-two categories of industries involved in APAs). 
221. See I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 916 tbl.4.
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equipment.222 There is likely a commonality of issues among these
agreements from which to generate guidance information.
This information could include which of the suggested transfer pricing
methods are predominantly used and accepted by the IRS for APAs 
issued in that industry.223  This would help Program applicants select a
transfer pricing method among the many options available and provide
the required detailed explanation for why that is the best method for their 
business’s circumstances.224  Weighing against this change is that limited 
summary industry guidance might not reveal enough information to be 
of significant help to practitioners, especially when compared with the
publication of redacted agreements.225 
Yet another possibility for increasing transparency would be for the 
IRS to supplement the current administrative information provided in the 
reports with additional descriptive data.226  Useful additional information 
would include information on the occurrences of the IRS rolling back an 
APA to adjust a taxpayer’s previous transfer pricing transaction and the
number of APA requests that the IRS denies each year.227  From an 
accountability perspective, it would also be useful to know if and when 
the IRS has waived or excused requirements that the Program traditionally
places on participating businesses.228  Ideally, this information would gauge
the Program’s effectiveness and hold it accountable to the public, especially 
if supplemented by disclosed agreements. 
Even though this information would be of some help, the complaints 
regarding secret laws and unfair treatment leveled at the APMA Program
could not be addressed solely by publishing more detailed reports.
222. Id. at 917 tbl.4a. 
223. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482(c)(2) (as amended in 2012).  The IRS does partially
provide this information, but it reports only the transfer pricing methods used based on 
two broad categories of transactions covered by the agreements: services and tangible and 
intangible property. See I.R.S. Announcement 2013-17, 2013-16 I.R.B. 911, 921. 
224. Under current APMA procedures, a taxpayer must provide a detailed explanation
and analysis of why the “proposed TPM [transfer pricing method] is the best method
within the meaning of § 1.482-1(c).”  Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 282, § 4.03(20). 
An applicant must also apply this proposed transfer pricing method to its previous three 
taxable years or instead project it onto hypothetical data when applying it to a new 
business or product.  Id. § 4.03(24). 
225. Industry guidance would presumably not include the level of detail that could 
be found in hundreds of released redacted pricing agreements. 
226. See Letter from Sen. Grassley, supra note 120. 
227. See id. (asking the IRS to provide copies of all IRS materials for the letter’s
attached list of organizations); see also Sullivan, supra note 88 (reporting the allegation
by GlaxoSmithKline that the IRS refused to act on its APA application).
228. See Letter from Sen. Grassley, supra note 120 (asking for IRS materials on
particular organizations that finance terrorism and perpetuate violence to oversee their
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Moreover, the Program would not be significantly more accountable to 
the public merely because of more detailed annual reporting. Also,
requiring greater disclosure through annual reports would consume some 
of the Program’s resources.  This proposal, however, would not involve the 
larger implementation issues related to redacting and releasing APAs.
C. Increase Program Transparency Through an Administrative Appeal 
Process for the Cancellation or Revocation of APAs 
Even more useful for potential APMA Program users would be
additional information about the situations in which the IRS cancels or 
revokes an APA.229  When the IRS cancels an APA, the taxpayer loses 
any benefits that the APA provided from the beginning of the current tax 
year.230  But if the IRS revokes an agreement, then “the APA is void ab 
initio and is treated as if it never existed,” which would be devastating
for any Program participant.231  At the outset, government officials 
responsible for the Program characterized the agreements as “nearly
ironclad.”232  This characterization is illustrated by the difficulties that a
taxpayer encounters when seeking to amend an APA.233  In this situation, 
former APA Program Director Sean Foley described the IRS’s position 
as “‘a deal is a deal,’ because APAs are about certainty.”234  Yet, under
section 11.06 of Revenue Procedure 2006-9, the IRS can cancel an APA 
based on the taxpayer’s “misrepresentation, mistake as to a material fact, 
failure to state a material fact, failure to file a timely annual report, or lack 
of good faith compliance with the terms and conditions of the APA.”235 
The IRS will also coordinate the cancellation action with the foreign 
competent authority for any bilateral or multilateral APA, removing the 
tax benefits of the agreement in the other taxing jurisdiction.236 
The IRS recently exercised this power for “compliance violations” 
against Eaton Corporation, cancelling both of the company’s APAs and
229. This proposal is extrapolated from the surrounding circumstances and the 
discussion of the cancellation of two of Eaton Corporation’s APAs. See infra notes 237– 
41 and accompanying text. 
230.  Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 291, § 11.06(7). 
231.  Coder, supra note 30. 
232.  Id. 
 233. See id.
 234. Id.
235.  Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 291, § 11.06(2). 
















   
 




     
 
 
   
 
  










concurrently assessing against it $127 million in additional taxes and
misstatement penalties.237 In an approach similar to Glaxo, Eaton filed 
suit against the IRS and is determined to challenge the cancellation of its
agreements through costly litigation, alleging that its two APAs were
abruptly cancelled on a whim and without a substantive basis.238  This  
dispute “has the potential to do real damage to the APA program,” with 
litigation again being used to attempt to drag the Program through the
mud.239  When the Service pulls out of an APA, “it tarnishes the reputation 
of that agreement process.”240  Especially troubling is the fact that there
was “no opportunity for discussion with Appeals” of the cancellations
before the IRS abruptly informed the company of the cancellations and
served a notice of tax deficiency.241 
Accordingly, one solution to prevent repeated harm to the Program’s
reputation is to require an internal appeal process when the Service makes 
the decision to cancel an APA.  This proposal would increase internal
transparency for businesses using the Program.  The IRS already employs 
similar appeal processes for many other determinations that the Service
makes.242 The IRS’s Office of Appeals strives to resolve tax controversies 
without litigation on a fair and impartial basis to the government and the
taxpayer “in a manner that will enhance voluntary compliance and public 
confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the Service.”243  Considering 
the situation surrounding Eaton and the subsequent fallout in the taxpaying 
community,244 the cancellation of an APA is an apt opportunity for the 
appeals office to further its goals.  With their magnitude, complexity, and
asserted ironclad status, APAs should not be cancelled without a thorough 
vetting of the circumstances.  An internal appeal process decreases the
chances that a company such as Eaton will choose to use the Tax Court and 
external litigation to receive a second opinion, consuming more Program
resources in the process.245 This appears especially true in Eaton’s case
because it was not given a chance to appeal the decision to revoke its
237. See Coder, supra note 30. 
238. Petition, Eaton Corp. v. Comm’r, 2013 T.C.M. (CCH) 59,575 (2013) (No. 5576-
12); Coder, supra note 30. The U.S. Tax Court subsequently held that it had jurisdiction 
to review the cancellation of APAs, albeit only at an abuse of discretion standard.  Eaton 
Corp., 2013 T.C.M. (CCH) 59,575. 
239. Coder, supra note 30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
241. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
242. Appeals. . . Resolving Tax Disputes, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Appeals 
...-Resolving-Tax-Disputes (last updated Jan. 23, 2014) (providing information on the 
appeals process, which “resolves over 100,000 cases per year”). 
243. Id.
 244. See Coder, supra note 30. 
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APA to the Office of Appeals.246  This outcome practically left the
company no choice but to file a complaint and draw public ire to the 
Program in the process.247  Whereas releasing redacted agreements arguably 
has the potential to chill taxpayer participation in the Program, requiring 
the IRS to be more transparent with taxpayers before terminating their 
pricing agreements would make the Program more attractive to potential 
business users. 
Unlike the proposal to improve transparency by releasing redacted 
agreements, requiring an appeal process for terminating APAs has few
drawbacks. APAs are rarely cancelled, and the limited resources spent
on reviewing a decision before cancelling or revoking an agreement would
be offset if even one lawsuit were prevented.248  Further, the IRS already 
contains the internal structure needed to handle reviewing the agency’s
complex determinations, its Office of Appeals. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With billions of dollars at stake, transfer pricing remains a potent
battleground for both international businesses and the IRS.249  While
businesses are increasingly turning to complex tax strategies that involve 
transfer pricing, the IRS is responding by hiring specialists and allocating 
substantial resources to intensify transfer pricing enforcement.250 
Meanwhile, the APMA Program that the Service advertises as an open 
and cooperative solution to prevent transfer pricing disputes is mired in 
secrecy and has been scrutinized for its delay in processing applications.251 
With application numbers recovering but public criticism persisting, the 
IRS should look to other possibilities for improving the APMA Program 
besides its recent administrative restructuring.252  One possibility is to
enhance the Program’s utility by increasing its transparency.253 
First, to bolster transparency, the IRS should release redacted APAs to
the public.254  Despite the fact that in 1999 Congress bowed to pressure 
246. 
247.  See id. 
See Coder, supra note 30. 
 248.  See Petition, supra note 238; Coder, supra note 30. 
249.  See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
250.  See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
251.  See supra Part III.B. 
252. See supra Part III.B. 
253.  See supra Part IV. 








   



























to prevent the IRS from doing so, releasing agreements would still be 
net beneficial for the Program.255  The predominant concern surrounding 
the release of these agreements—the potential for jeopardizing taxpayer 
privacy—can be mitigated by using the protective procedures that the IRS 
utilizes for releasing similar documents that contain both taxpayer and 
“working law” information.256  Moreover, this concern can be minimized 
further by delaying the release of the redacted pricing agreements.257 
Second, even if APAs are not released, increasing the amount of
information disclosed in the Program’s annual reports can improve the 
Program’s transparency.258  The current annual reports lack any substantive
transfer pricing guidance or examples of an actual complete pricing 
agreement.259 Providing additional information about industries and the
internal administration of the Program is not barred by the applicable
statute, and these changes would assist businesses outside of the Program
and improve its damaged reputation.260  Further, this proposal would
consume few resources and is not subject to the same privacy concerns
raised by releasing redacted agreements.261 
Third, adding a mandatory internal review procedure for the IRS’s APA 
cancellation process can further increase transparency and bolster the
Program’s appeal.262  The Program is again under scrutiny for terminating
two agreements and is embroiled in resulting litigation.263  This final  
proposal would consume few resources and potentially deter similar 
reputation-damaging litigation by adding credibility to the IRS’s final
decision to cancel an APA.264 
Ultimately, the IRS’s APMA Program is filled with potential but
is harmed by its lack of transparency, a problem that fosters discontent 
within the public. With a broad trend toward increased governmental
transparency and the IRS’s call for more transparency from taxpayers, it
is an ideal opportunity for the Service to reciprocate on its end.265  By
increasing transparency through the adoption of one or more of these 
255. See supra Part V.A.
 256. See supra Part V.A.2. 
257. See supra Part V.A.2. 
258. See supra Part V.B. 
259. See supra Part V.B. 
260. See supra Part V.B. 
261. See supra Part V.B. 
262. See supra Part V.C 
263. See supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra Part V.C. 
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proposals, the Program can better achieve its prime goal of solving transfer 
pricing issues for businesses in an open and cooperative manner.266 
266. See supra note 72. 
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